Splunk and Windows Event Log: Best Practices, Reduction and Enhancement

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Agenda

- Getting Windows Events into Splunk: Patterns and Practices
- TURN DOWN THE VOLUME: License reduction tips
- Making them more useful: Improving knowledge objects




Ground Rules

- Fidelity levels
 - How complete are the events?
- Windows Event interpretation
 - These are binary records
 - Agents can read them directly or ask the Windows API
 - This means that you aren't really getting the event log, just a representation of it








Getting Windows Events into Splunk

Different Ways to Skin a Cat


- Best to Worst
 - Universal Forwarder
 - Windows Event Forwarding
 - WMI
 - EVTX Import
 - Third Party Syslog Agent (Snare, for example)





Universal Forwarder

- The best way to get Windows events (of course we're biased)
- Pros
 - High fidelity
 - Can be controlled by Deployment Server
 - Can filter Windows events
 - Can run scripts (batch, exe, PS)
 - Can also get admon (great for assets and identities)
- Cons
 - "Another agent!?!?"
 - Security concerns




Windows Event Forwarding

- Native to Windows (2008R2 and up)
- Pros
 - Native to Windows, no agent
 - Can be configured with GPO
- Cons
 - Almost high fedlity
 - Slower
 - Customer testing shows it consumes more resources than a UF


WMI

- Used by a Splunk system to collect Windows Events from a remote system
- Pros
 - Remote, no agent
- Cons
 - Slow
 - A lot of overhead
 - Limited collection availability (may need multiple systems to pull all of your Windows hosts)
 - Low fidelity
 - Dealing with permissions



EVTX Import

- Can be used to export event logs from a system and then import the raw files on another system
- Often seen in "air-gapped" environments
- Pros
 - No network connection needed from the client systems to the target indexers
- Cons
 - Low fidelity (remember that "interpretation" thing earlier?)
 - Moving and removing the files is a manual process
 - Open to event duplication



Third Party Syslog Agent (Snare)

- It's a thing, these agents exist
- Pros
 - Can work with your existing syslog infrastructure
- Cons
 - Super low fidelity
 - Unreliable (syslog never dies)
 - Remote configuration?

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Many Solutions, One Goal.




TURN DOWN THE VOLUME: License reduction tips

These things are chatty

- Splunk estimates between 200-300mb per day, per system
- Of course, that can vary wildly
- Lots of repeated events with little to no value (looking at you 4662)
- Do we really need all of these?
- Do we need every part of all of these?








Stratergery

- Pick your systems carefully
- Pick your inputs carefully on those systems
- Whitelist and Blacklist carefully
- Resolving objects
- Baseline?
- Current_only? Start_from?
- XmlWinEventLog
- Filtering and cleaning up



Which systems?

- Just Active Directory servers?
- Endpoints?
- Servers?
- Sorry, this is on a case by case basis

APLUR

Many Solutions, One Goal.

Picking your inputs (not your nose)

- Set a baseline for which logs ALL of your systems should be sending
- For other eventlogs, use an individual app for turning on that input (DS-Input-wineventlog_application)
- Do you need admon from all of your systems? Probably not, just on a few AD systems
- Make sure you aren't using legacy inputs (WMI vs Perfmon)
- Look out for Windows Firewall Events (maybe Stream instead?)





Whitelisting and Blacklisting

- Can have a big impact on your license usage
- Investing the time in "which events" can pay off big
- Careful with a whitelist-only approach
- Note that there is a limit to the number of lists
- Performed at the forwarder, so does not use network traffic

Many Solutions, One Goal

Some nice blacklist options to start with

• https://gist.github.com/automine/a3915d5238e2967c8d44b0ebcfb66147

```
[WinEventLog://Security]
disabled = 0
start_from = oldest
current_only = 0
evt_resolve_ad_obj = 1
checkpointInterval = 5
blacklist1 = EventCode="4662" Message="Object Type:\s+(?!groupPolicyContainer)"
blacklist2 = EventCode="566" Message="Object Type:\s+(?!groupPolicyContainer)"
blacklist3 = EventCode="4688" Message="New Process Name: (?i)^(C:\\Program
Files\\Splunk(?:UniversalForwarder)?\\bin\\(?:btool|splunkd|splunk|splunk\-(?:MonitorNoHandle|admon|netmon|perfmon|powershell|regmon|winevtlog|winhostinfo|winprintmon|wmi))\.exe)"
```

AD Object Resolution

- Resolves things like SIDs and GIUDs
- You can tell Splunk which DCs to use to resolve these
- Can add some overhead (CPU and Memory), but usually low impact
- Recommendation is to resolve them (look at the evt_*) options in inputs.conf for Windows Event Logs



Baselining AD


- Will collect your whole AD schema
- Can take up a lot of memory on AD controllers
- But baselining is useful for Assets and Identities in ES
- So be careful which systems you baseline on

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Many Solutions, One Goal.

Current_only vs. start_from

- Current_only tells Splunk to only grab the latest events (like tail –f, if Windows had such a thing)
- Useful to make sure you don't get all of the historical data
- May want to set that to "true" on initial deployment
- Then set to "false", restart, and it should pick up from the checkpoint
- Start from should be "oldest"
- Setting it to "newest" can be used to grab a backlog of events
 - I've never seen this in the wild





XmlWinEventLog

- Should reduce license usage (claims are up to 70%)
- It will always be in English (pro? Con?)
- Harder to read, I mean, it's XML
- Quality of CIM compliance has been varied in the past
- It doesn't "look like Windows events" and some auditors are not bright
- What if you could get the same log savings and the readability





Filtering and cleaning up

- Don't use "suppress_text"
- It's tempting, but there goes the baby with the bathwater
- Maybe just clean up the text you don't need



Filtering and cleaning up

- IPv6 support in event logs results in a lot of "::" and "ffff" and other garbage
- Let's clean up a lot (thanks to a lot of people for this)

```
[WinEventLog:Security]
#Returns most of the space savings XML would provide

SEDCMD-clean0-null_sids = s/(?m)(^\s+[^:]+\:)\s+-?$/\1/g s/(?m)(^\s+[^:]+\:)\s+-?$/\1/g s/(?m)(\:)(\s+NULL SID)$/\1/g s/(?m)(ID\:)(\s+0x0)$/\1/g

SEDCMD-clean1-summary = s/This event is generated[\S\s\r\n]+$//g

SEDCMD-clean2-cert_summary = s/Certificate information is only[\S\s\r\n]+$//g

SEDCMD-clean3-blank_ipv6 = s/::ffff://g

SEDCMD-clean4-token_elevation_summary = s/Token Elevation Type indicates[\S\s\r\n]+$//g


SEDCMD-clean5-firewall_summary = s/(?ms)(The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted.*$)//g


SEDCMD-clean6-network_share_summary = s/(?ms)(A network share object was checked to see whether.*$)//g

SEDCMD-clean7-authentication_summary = s/(?ms)(The computer attempted to validate the credentials.*$)//g


SEDCMD-clean8-local_ipv6 = s/(?ms)(::1)//g
```

• https://gist.github.com/automine/5c8ef5b50e1df38249dfba01a70f2875





Making Them More Useful



Sorry, I ran out of time

- Got ES? Take a look at Ryan Faircloth's SecKit work
 - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3059/
 - https://bitbucket.org/SPLServices/seckit_sa_idm_windows
- Alternative TAs
 - Should help with KO overhead
 - https://github.com/my2ndhead/TA-microsoft-windows (can do XML events)
 - https://bitbucket.org/SPLServices/seckit ta microsoft windows (for use with SecKit)

